

Using the **MyProxy** Online Credential Repository

Jim Basney

National Center for Supercomputing Applications

University of Illinois


jbasney@ncsa.uiuc.edu

What is MyProxy?

- Independent Globus Toolkit add-on since 2000
 - ◆ To be included in Globus Toolkit 4.0
- A service for securing private keys
 - ◆ Keys stored encrypted with user-chosen password
 - ◆ Keys never leave the MyProxy server
- A service for retrieving proxy credentials
- A commonly-used service for grid portal security
 - ◆ Integrated with OGCE, GridSphere, and GridPort


PKI Overview

- **Public Key Cryptography**
 - ◆ Sign with private key, verify signature with public key
 - ◆ Encrypt with public key, decrypt with private key
- **Key Distribution**
 - ◆ Who does a public key belong to?
 - ◆ Certification Authority (CA) verifies user's identity and signs certificate
 - ◆ Certificate is a document that binds the user's identity to a public key
- **Authentication**
 - ◆ Signature [$h(\text{random}, \dots)$]



Proxy Credentials


- RFC 3820: Proxy Certificate Profile
- Associate a new private key and certificate with existing credentials
- Short-lived, unencrypted credentials for multiple authentications in a session
 - ◆ Restricted lifetime in certificate limits vulnerability of unencrypted key
- Credential delegation (forwarding) without transferring private keys




Proxy Delegation

Delegator


Delegatee




MyProxy System Architecture




MyProxy: Credential Mobility





MyProxy and Grid Portals



Login




Fetch proxy




Access data

MyProxy: User Registration



PURSE: Portal-based User Registration Service




MyProxy Security

- Keys encrypted with user-chosen passwords
 - ◆ Server enforces password quality
 - ◆ Passwords are not stored
- Dedicated server less vulnerable than desktop and general-purpose systems
 - ◆ Professionally managed, monitored, locked down
- Users retrieve short-lived credentials
 - ◆ Generating new proxy keys for every session
- All server operations logged to syslog
- Caveat: Private key database is an attack target
 - ◆ Compare with status quo

Hardware-Secured MyProxy

- Protect keys in tamper-resistant cryptographic hardware



M. Lorch, J. Basney, and D. Kafura, "A Hardware-secured Credential Repository for Grid PKIs," 4th IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid (CCGrid), April 2004.



GlobusWORLD 2003 Flashback




- **Viewpoint #1: End entities should have sole possession of their long-term keys**
 - Administrator access to end entity keys voids non-repudiation
- **Viewpoint #2: End entities can't be trusted to secure their long-term keys**
 - Centralized key distribution enforces password policies and credential lifetime limits
- **Will this issue hinder cross-site collaboration?**

Credential Renewal

- Long-lived jobs or services need credentials
 - ◆ Task lifetime is difficult to predict
- Don't want to delegate long-lived credentials
 - ◆ Fear of compromise
- Instead, renew credentials as needed during the job's lifetime
 - ◆ Renewal service provides a single point of monitoring and control
- Renewal policy can be modified at any time
 - ◆ Disable renewals if compromise is detected or suspected
 - ◆ Disable renewals when jobs complete

MyProxy: Credential Renewal



Condor
High Throughput Computing

MyProxy Installation (Unix)

- Included in GT 4.0
- As an add-on component to GT 3.x
 - \$ gpt-build myproxy*.tar.gz <flavor>
- Set \$MYPROXY_SERVER environment variable to myproxy-server hostname
 - \$ export MYPROXY_SERVER=myproxy.ncsa.uiuc.edu
- Set Globus Toolkit environment
 - \$. \$GLOBUS_LOCATION/etc/globus-user-env.sh
- Client installation/configuration complete!

MyProxy CoG Clients

- Commodity Grid (CoG) Kits
 - ◆ Provide portable (Java and Python) MyProxy client tools & APIs
 - ◆ Windows support
- For more information:
 - ◆ <http://www.cogkit.org/>

MyProxy Commands

- **myproxy-init**: store proxy
- **myproxy-get-delegation**: retrieve proxy
- **myproxy-info**: query stored credentials
- **myproxy-destroy**: remove credential
- **myproxy-change-pass-phrase**:
change password encrypting private key

MyProxy Server Administration

- Install server certificate and CA certificate(s)
- Configure `/etc/myproxy-server.config` policy
 - ◆ Template provided with examples
- Optionally:
 - ◆ Configure password quality enforcement
 - ◆ Install cron script to delete expired credentials
- Install boot script and start server
 - ◆ Example boot script provided
- Use `myproxy-admin` commands to manage server
 - ◆ Reset passwords, query repository, lock credentials

MyProxy Server Policies

- Who can store credentials?
 - ◆ Restrict to specific users or CAs
 - ◆ Restrict to administrator only
 - Who can retrieve credentials?
 - ◆ Allow anyone with correct password
 - ◆ Allow only trusted services / portals
 - Maximum lifetime of retrieved credentials
- server-wide
and
per-credential

MyProxy and SASL

- MyProxy supports additional authentication mechanisms via SASL (RFC 2222)
- One Time Passwords (SASL PLAIN with PAM)
 - ◆ Protect against stolen passwords
 - ◆ Hardware token generates OTP
 - ◆ Authenticate with OTP plus MyProxy password
 - ◆ Tested with CryptoCard tokens 
- Kerberos (SASL GSSAPI)
 - ◆ Authenticate with Kerberos ticket plus MyProxy password

Related Work

- GT4 Delegation Service
 - ◆ Protocol based on WS-Trust and WSRF
- SACRED (RFC 3767) Credential Repository
 - ◆ <http://sacred.sf.net/>
- Kerberized Online CA (KX.509/KCA)
 - ◆ Kerberos -> PKI
- PKINIT for Heimdal Kerberos
 - ◆ PKI -> Kerberos

GridLogon

- Work in progress
- Inspired by Peter Gutmann's PKIBoot
 - ◆ "Plug-and-Play PKI:
A PKI your Mother can Use"
- Password-based authentication to initialize user's security environment
 - ◆ Install identity/attribute/authorization credentials
 - ◆ Install CA certificates and CRLs
 - ◆ Install additional security configurations

MyProxy Community

- myproxy-users@ncsa.uiuc.edu mailing list
- Bug tracking:
<http://bugzilla.ncsa.uiuc.edu/>
- Anonymous CVS access
:pserver:anonymous@cvs.ncsa.uiuc.edu:/CVS/myproxy
- Contributions welcome!
 - ◆ Feature requests, bug reports, patches, etc.

Thank you!

Questions/Comments?

Contact:
jbasney@ncsa.uiuc.edu